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"PROBABLY NO AMERICAN can understand the Asiatic concept of 'face.' This is perhaps fortunate. In view of how much 'face' the U.S. has lost in the Orient, we would have to burn Washington to recover it."

Clare Boothe Luce, writing in the current issue of NATIONAL REVIEW.

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THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE, by Allen Dulles. Harper & Row. \$4.95.


It takes an effort these days to make oneself believe that even in a police state like Soviet Russia there exists a high-level government department with no function except to plan and carry out the assassination of the régime's enemies who have gone abroad. I had supposed that bureaucratized murder must have disappeared with the death of Stalin and the liquidation of Beria. Thanks to Mr. Dulles's book, I now know that the "Executive Action" section of the KGB, the Soviet secret service, continues to carry out murders in the name of ideology.

"... In the subsequent era of so-called 'socialist legality' which was proclaimed by Khrushchev in 1956," Mr. Dulles reveals, "a later generation of exiled leaders was decimated. The only difference between the earlier and later crops of political murders lay in the subtlety and efficacy of the murder weapons. The mysterious deaths in Munich, in 1957 and 1959, of Lev Rebet and Stephen Bandera, leaders of the Ukrainian émigrés, were managed with a cyanide spray that killed almost instantaneously."

As Mr. Dulles points out, the importance the Soviet government continues to attach to the mission of the Executive Action section is demonstrated by the recent appointment of General Korovin (real name Nikolay B. Rodin) to head it. Korovin was the top-level KGB agent who as counselor of the Soviet embassy in London from 1953 to early 1961 was in charge of the subsequently notorious George Blake and William Vassall. It makes you wonder.


The Craft of Intelligence was not intended as a controversial book. The polemical tone is absent, the good faith transparent. There is, naturally, some earnest salesmanship in the cause of foreign intelligence as an essential component of the national security and on behalf of the

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CIA itself as an indispensable arm of government. There is not the slightest trace of any special pleading on behalf of Mr. Dulles's own role as director of the agency, no oblique jab at the administration that terminated it. Those who believe—I suspect with some justification—that his retirement in 1961 was a kind of ritual sacrifice for errors of judgment or character committed by persons outside his service in the Bay of Pigs fiasco will find nothing either to substantiate or to invalidate the suspicion. In or out of office, Allen Dulles is incorrigibly discreet, unfailingly gentlemanly. His book, a lucid, authoritatively documented primer on the art and profession of intelligence, apparently addressed to the general public, suffers occasionally from these virtues.

Yet thanks to the fantastic acceleration of history in our day, Mr. Dulles has produced at least a small bombshell in spite of himself. Retrospective shivers run down one's spine in reading his mild comments on the intelligence background of the Cuba crisis last year. Despite the "serious premonitions" of Dulles's

successor at CIA, John A. McCone, the Washington intelligence community long refused to believe agent reports that Khrushchev was installing offensive missile bases in Cuba: he could not afford to run such a risk, the experts affirmed. Only after much argument, and barely in the nick of time, did the reconnaissance planes discover that Khrushchev didn't know the rules. "Cuba," Mr. Dulles observes, "is yet another instance to warn us that one must be prepared for Khrushchev to do the unexpected, the unusual, the shocking. . . ." The warning was merely prudent when Mr. Dulles was writing his book; today, some six or eight months later, with any heretical "premonitions" in the intelligence community far more effectively stifled than before and with belief in Khrushchev's irrevocable commitment to a durable détente reinforced, it sounds a great deal more pointed.

Like most professional intelligence officers in Western Europe, Mr. Dulles is convinced that the Soviets in adopting more subtle techniques of subversion have not abandoned their goal of destroying our society and

establishing world dominion. His interesting and important thoughts on this subject no doubt had only a cautionary intent when he wrote them down; in the light of recent diplomatic developments they constitute an implicit but nonetheless disturbing critique of the Kennedy administration's Soviet policy. There are several hints in the book that Mr. Dulles's views on the critical and controversial issue of Khrushchev's long-range intentions toward the West are based on definite information of some kind. It is a great pity that he has not felt able to reveal the general nature of this information, if it exists.

Even if Mr. Dulles's opinion is merely the fruit of his years of experience in the intelligence craft and the "feel" for the enemy's intentions they have given him, it would be worth listening to. But if he wants it to illumine the national debate on the issue instead of merely adding controversial heat, he will have to bolster it with more sophisticated analysis than this book attempts to offer. No doubt he is preparing at some suitable moment to do so.

Our Seventeenth-Century Approach to Peace

F. H. Hinsley boldly challenges us to modernize our view of world power relations and their significance for the future in

POWER AND THE PURSUIT OF PEACE


In his call for a more scientific approach to the problem of peace in our time, Hinsley blasts most of the familiar cold-war clichés — beginning with the dogma that parity in nuclear weapons has been our sole protection against international holocaust. "If they had never been invented . . . there would still have been no danger of a general war since 1945 — and there would still be no danger of a general war for some time to come, on account of other factors in the situation."

These "other factors" will startle most Americans:

- *the new atmosphere of responsibility among the great powers — typified by American refusal to extend the Korean war and the Russians' careful limitation of expansionist aims after World War II
- *the powers' unwillingness to risk present gains in general warfare, coupled with their ability to control localized conflicts
- *the unlikelihood of oft-predicted accidental warfare

In his climactic last chapter, the author makes some carefully supported prophecies for the next forty years — prophecies that will delight some, anger others, and stimulate all readers to really fresh thinking on the central issue of our age.

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